8. Establish quasi-capital ceilings and then gradually lower them.
We reserve the term quasi-capital for permanent enterprise financing whose direct provider is not a saver. This statement is, however, an admissible definition in the logic of finite sets only under two conditions.
The first is to grant that “permanent” applies only to what lasts until the end (see first proposition 5.2). The other condition is to agree, likewise, to reserve the term “savers” for individuals, families, foundations, and other non-commercial associations.
It then becomes clear that permanent enterprise financing is not the same depending on whether it is supplied by savers proper or by other entities. When one of these entities becomes a holder of shares of capital (capital), fewer powers of impulse and arbitration are exercised by savers proper, as indicated in the argument of proposition 5.5.
To counter confiscations of power and reductions of competition by means of quasi-capital, provisions are needed that restrict the use of this endogamous mode of permanent financing. A company composed of companies should no longer be seen as systemically equivalent to a company whose shareholders are individuals, families, foundations, and other non-commercial private associations.
The differentiation is introduced when the legislator takes on the setting of ceilings of quasi-capital, by broad sectors of activity but without distinction of enterprise size.
Endogamy through companies of companies can be reduced by the progressive lowering of the ceilings of quasi-capital. What the exchange of placements in capital for their periodic remuneration brings to the common good, when one of the two parties is a saver proper, is thereby increased.
Proportionally, the more voting rights at the general meetings of incorporated enterprises are held by the first suppliers of capital, the more the population weighs on the composition of boards of directors and the directions taken by these enterprises. When earnings, after allocations to mandatory reserves and employee profit-sharing, are entirely distributed to shareholders and at the same time capital increases are opened, an additional vote of confidence is added: its score is the portion of the capital increase subscribed by the members who received the dividends.
Through less and less quasi-capital, country by country the self-regulating relationship between the stock of capital and the stock of jobs is strengthened, until full employment finally becomes the norm and underemployment the temporary exception.
Employers can hardly be blamed for not spontaneously favoring this course, which reduces their prerogatives. But the governments that work in the service of the general interest are those of nations where, in economic matters especially, that interest is discerned clearly enough by the majority of voters.